Improving the Equity-Efficiency Trade-Off: Mandatory Savings Accounts for Social Insurance. by A. Lans Bovenberg & Peter Birch Sørensen
EPRU 
 
Economic Policy Research Unit 
Institute of Economics 
University of Copenhagen 
Studiestræde 6 
DK-1455 Copenhagen K 
DENMARK 
Tel: (+45) 3532 4411 









Improving the Equity-Efficiency Trade-Off: 
Mandatory Savings Accounts for Social  Insurance 
 
A. Lans Bovenberg 
Peter Birch Sørensen 
 
2003-07 





















The activities of EPRU are financed by a grant from 






A. Lans Bovenberg, Tilburg University, OCFEB, CEPR and CESifo∗)
Peter Birch Sørensen, University of Copenhagen, EPRU and CESifo∗∗)
Paper prepared for the 59th Annual Congress of the
International Institute of Public Finance
in Prague, August 25-28, 2003
Abstract
In the modern welfare state a substantial part of an individual’s tax bill is transferred
back to the same individual taxpayer in the form of social transfers. This provides a
rationale for ﬁnancing part of social insurance through mandatory savings accounts. We
analyze the behavioral and welfare eﬀects of compulsory savings accounts in an intertem-
poral model with uncertainty, endogenous involuntary unemployment and retirement
decisions, credit constraints, and heterogeneous agents. We show that the introduction
of (early) retirement and unemployment accounts generates a Pareto improvement by
enabling the government to provide lifetime income insurance and liquidity insurance in
am o r ee ﬃcient manner.
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1. Introduction
T h ep r o s p e c to fp o p u l a t i o na g e i n gi nt h eO E C De c o n o m i e sh a sg e n e r a t e da ni n t e n s e
debate on the need for pension reform. Much of the academic controversy has focussed
on the question whether moving from Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) pensions to fully funded
systems based on individual savings accounts can produce a Pareto improvement. The
literature has concluded that the government cannot improve the welfare of all generations
through such a switch (see e.g. Breyer (1989) and Sinn (2000)). If the current social
security tax is replaced by public debt to ﬁnance the continued payment of pensions
to the older generation during the transition to funding, the future taxes servicing the
higher public debt exactly oﬀset the gains of future generations from the higher return
on pension saving oﬀered by a funded system.
Homburg (1990) has argued, however, that funded individual accounts could make all
generations better oﬀ if the initial transfer system distorts endogenous labor supply. The
reason is that a closer individual link between contributions and beneﬁts boosts labor
supply, thereby alleviating labor-market distortions. The resulting eﬃciency gains can be
distributed in such a way that all generations beneﬁt. In the presence of intragenerational
heterogeneity,2 however, one has to ensure that not only all generations but also all
households within a generation beneﬁt (see also Fenge (1995), Brunner (1996) and Belan
and Pestieau (1999)). Whereas a switch to a pension system in which all agents fund their
own pensions eliminates the labor market distortion from a ’Beveridgean’ PAYG system
with a ﬂat pension beneﬁt, such a reform also does away with the intragenerational
1In preparing this paper we have beneﬁted from discussions with and criticisms by Henrik Kleven,
Pierre Pestieau, Bo Sandemann Rasmussen and Dave Wildasin. Any remaining shortcomings are our
own responsibility.
2Without intragenerational heterogeneity, the optimal tax-transfer system would not need to distort
labor supply, as lump-sum taxes would be optimal.
2redistribution achieved by such a PAYG system. The reform, therefore, is likely to
hurt low-income households. In fact, if the initial Beveridgean pension beneﬁth a sb e e n
optimized by trading oﬀ the marginal equity gain against the marginal eﬃciency cost, a
switch to individual funding cannot be Pareto-improving.
This analysis thus conﬁrms the major lesson of the literature on the transition from
funding to PAYG, namely that a Pareto improvement, which protects all agents, is fea-
sible only if pension reform is accompanied by a reduction of a distortion somewhere in
the economy. Examples of such possible distortions are the corporate income tax, ineﬃ-
cient redistribution, labor-market distortions due to incentives to retire early, inability of
the political process to commit to promises (and the associated political risks), missing
insurance markets (e.g. due to aggregate risks or the inability of agents to commit to
insurance contracts before they are born), capital-market imperfections, and knowledge
externalities. The associated eﬃciency gains should be ascribed to the cut in these dis-
tortions rather than the transition to funding. Indeed, the gains could be reaped also
without changing to a funded system. Moreover, if the system has been optimized prior
to the reform, one cannot obtain a Pareto improvement by moving to a funded system.
This paper shows that funding through compulsory savings accounts can be Pareto
improving, even if (in contrast to most of the literature on the transition to funding)
one allows for intragenerational heterogeneity. Hence, all agents gain from the reform,
irrespective of the shocks they experience during their lifetimes. The key to this result
is that the savings accounts protect households who suﬀer from low lifetime incomes.
In particular, individual funding and the associated self insurance applies only to high-
income earners and the middle class. Low-income earners still beneﬁtf r o mt a x - ﬁnanced
transfers. As another extension of the voluminous literature on the role of savings ac-
counts in old-age social security, we explore whether compulsory savings accounts can
more eﬃciently ﬁnance social insurance for individuals of working age.3
The savings accounts considered in this paper are inspired by Fölster (1994, 1997)
and work as follows. For each taxpayer an individual account is established. Part of the
taxpayer’s annual tax bill is replaced by a mandatory social security contribution, which
3Orszag and Snower (1997a, 1997b), Feldstein and Altman (1998), Orszag et al. (1999), and Fölster
et al. (2002) propose savings accounts to ﬁnance social insurance for the working population.
3is credited to his individual account. The contribution is computed as a percentage of the
taxpayer’s income. Whenever the taxpayer receives a social beneﬁtp a y m e n tf r o mo n e
of the transfer programs included in the individual account scheme (e.g. unemployment
insurance, early retirement beneﬁts), a fraction of this beneﬁt is debited to the account. A
(risk-free) market interest rate is added to or subtracted from the balance on the account
each year. When one has reached the statutory retirement age, the government settles
the account. In particular, part of the balance on the compulsory savings account is used
to buy an annuity covering a fraction of the ordinary public pension. The balance that
remains after buying this annuity can be used to supplement the public pension. In this
way, the individual accounts are in fact integrated with the pension system. If the account
balance at the statutory retirement age is not suﬃcient to buy an annuity for the part of
the ordinary public pension beneﬁt that should be ﬁnanced out of individual accounts, the
government supplements the funds in the savings account so that the individual receives
the full ordinary public pension during old age. In this way, the government eﬀectively
bails out households with low lifetime incomes.
We distinguish three types of compulsory savings accounts depending on which trans-
fer program is included in the accounts, namely unemployment accounts (UA), early
retirement accounts (ERA) and retirement accounts (RA). These accounts provide life-
time income insurance by guaranteeing a minimum public pension beneﬁtt h a td o e sn o t
depend on the funds in the account at statutory retirement. This provision ensures that
unlucky individuals who draw large amounts from social insurance programs relative to
their contributions have their beneﬁts, just like today, ﬁnanced out of general tax rev-
enue contributed by all taxpayers without any negative consequences for their minimum
old-age pensions. Moreover, the UA system also provides liquidity insurance by allowing
the worker to collect unemployment beneﬁts under eligibility rules identical to those ex-
isting at present, regardless of the size of the balance on his account. We show that, by
adding unemployment accounts to the existing tax-ﬁnanced system of social insurance,
the government can provide liquidity insurance more eﬃciently.
The basic reason why these compulsory accounts can produce a Pareto improvement
is that they add to the armory of ﬁscal instruments available to the government. By ob-
serving the balance in the compulsory savings accounts, the government in fact obtains
4information about individual lifetime incomes. This additional information allows the
government to oﬀer lifetime income insurance and liquidity insurance in a more eﬃcient
manner.4 The key aspect of the savings accounts is thus not funding, but rather the
additional information about individual lifetime incomes, which allows for more eﬃcient
insurance. Speciﬁcally, early retirement accounts combined with a minimum lifetime in-
come guarantee improve the labor market incentives of higher- and middle-income workers
(by creating an actuarial link between taxes and beneﬁts) without cutting into the con-
sumption of workers collecting only low lifetime incomes. Furthermore, in contrast to a
general cut in social beneﬁt rates, unemployment accounts enable the government to de-
crease the present value of public transfers without reducing the consumption possibilities
of liquidity-constrained unemployed workers.
The analysis in this paper extends and generalizes the work of Sørensen (2003). In
particular, we allow for a richer set of ﬁscal instruments and for more individual hetero-
geneity by introducing job search and uncertainty about involuntary unemployment as
well as uncertainty about future wages. We show that even if the government has access
to more ﬁscal instruments before the introduction of savings accounts and if additional
shocks yield more ex-post heterogeneity in lifetime incomes, compulsory savings accounts
can still make everybody better oﬀ. We also clearly separate the sources of the welfare
gains of RAs, ERAs and UAs, respectively.
The recent contribution by Stiglitz and Yun (2002) explores the optimal design of
unemployment accounts. These authors analyze how the optimal design of UAs is aﬀected
by the degree of risk aversion, the length of unemployment spells, and the sensitivity of job
search intensity to economic incentives. The present paper does not seek to characterize
the optimal UA providing lifetime income and liquidity insurance in the most eﬃcient way.
Instead, we demonstrate the possibility of a welfare-improving reform involving the use
of a particular type of compulsory savings accounts.5 Stiglitz and Yun (2002) evaluate
4Setting up and enforcing compulsory individual accounts and registering the individual balances
would obviously involve some costs. This paper does not analyze these costs. The beneﬁts of improved
lifetime income and liquidity insurance identiﬁed in this paper can be used to compute an upper bound
for the costs of a welfare-improving individual savings system.
5Indeed, in addition to bailing out households with insuﬃcient funds in their accounts, there may be
other ways to oﬀer lifetime income insurance, such as levying a linear tax on the accumulated account
balances of all households.
5the reforms on the basis of ex-ante utility (i.e. expected utility of individuals before
shocks occur and individuals are still homogeneous). We, in contrast, explore whether
the introduction of compulsory savings accounts can make everybody better oﬀ ex post
(i.e. after the shocks have occurred) — even individuals who experienced adverse shocks.
Compared to Stiglitz and Yun (2002), we also consider a richer set of shocks, including
involuntary unemployment and wage shocks. In this way, we focus on achieving a Pareto
improving reform in the presence of heterogeneous individuals rather than establishing
the most eﬃcient lifetime insurance system with ex-ante identical agents. Furthermore,
we include incentive eﬀects on labor supply of employed agents in addition to the moral
hazard eﬀects on job search considered by Stiglitz and Yun. Stiglitz and Yun also do not
analyze the case for ERA and RA and the similarities and diﬀerences between UA, on
the one hand, and ERA and RA, on the other hand. Rather, they take the existence of
RA as exogenously given.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the formal model
underlying our analysis. Section 3 demonstrates that introducing (early) retirement ac-
counts or unemployment accounts can yield a Pareto improvement. Section 4, ﬁnally,
contains our main conclusions and suggestions for future research.
2. The model framework
2.1. The basic setting
Agents live for two periods. At the start of period 1, agents are young and have no prior
labor market experience. As they are imperfectly informed about job opportunities,
young workers face some risk of being unable to ﬁnd employment during period 1. At
the start of period 2, all workers have previous job search experience and are thus able
to ﬁnd a job. However, an exogenous fraction of the previously unemployed lose human
capital as a result of being out of work. Due to this scarring eﬀect of unemployment,
these individuals earn a lower wage rate in period 2. This feature of the model allows us
to explore the importance of the correlation between unemployment shocks and negative
wage shocks during the life cycle (see section 3.3).
At some time before the end of period 2, workers decide (endogenously) to retire.
6Subsequently, they collect public pensions and annuities from their mandatory savings
accounts. Workers who are employed in both periods smooth their consumption through
life-cycle saving. Unemployed workers, in contrast, face liquidity constraints and hence
consume all their unemployment beneﬁts during period 1. Consequently, they enter period
2 without any ﬁnancial wealth.
Our framework includes both voluntary and involuntary unemployment. On the one
hand, a young worker who fails to ﬁnd a job in period 1 is involuntarily out of work. On
the other hand, an old worker may voluntarily opt for non-employment by retiring early.
The model also includes two sources of uncertainty. In particular, agents must decide
on their job search without knowing whether that search will be successful and whether
they will lose human capital if they would fail to ﬁnd a job in the ﬁrst period.
For the sake of simplicity, pre-tax factor prices are ﬁxed. The exogeneity of factor
prices may be rationalized by the assumption of a small open economy. Using a constant-
returns technology and facing perfect capital mobility, such an economy produces and
consumes a single good that is a perfect substitute for foreign goods. In this setting,
the exogenous world real interest rate determines domestic capital intensity, which in
turn ﬁxes the domestic pre-tax real wage. We allow wages to diﬀer across the two
periods. This may reﬂect diﬀerent period lengths (see also sub-section 3.3) or varying
labor productivities across the two periods.
2.2. Policy instruments
Individuals become heterogeneous only after the completion of job search. Ex ante all
individuals are identical and face the same risks. One may therefore ask why agents
cannot write optimal private insurance contracts before the start of period 1, thereby
eliminating the scope for Pareto-improving social insurance. To provide a rationale for
social insurance in our model, we assume that private insurance companies, in contrast
to the tax authorities, have diﬃculties in obtaining veriﬁable information about actual
labor incomes. Private suppliers of income insurance thus face more serious moral-hazard
problems than the government does. Another problem with private insurance is that
private insurers fail to internalize the external eﬀects of additional income insurance
on the tax base and public beneﬁts paid. Instead of leaving private insurers free to
7oﬀer these supplementary insurances, the government may therefore want to design and
regulate social insurance.6
As far as liquidity insurance is concerned, the private market fails because of selection
due to private information about a person’s risk of human capital loss. Speciﬁcally,
unemployed workers may well learn relatively early in period 1 whether they will lose
human capital, while this information remains private until a person’s wage rate in period
2 is revealed. Hence, banks do not know whether an unemployed worker asking for a loan
in period 1 will earn a normal or a subnormal wage in period 2. They may therefore be
unwilling to accommodate credit demand for fear that the value of the worker’s human
capital is not suﬃcient to prevent a default on the loan. The government can alleviate this
capital-market imperfection7 by forcing everybody to save through compulsory savings
accounts.
We assume that only linear taxes are available. Real-world tax systems are piece-wise
linear, so our simplifying assumption of linear taxes is not necessarily less realistic than
the alternative assumption of non-linear tax schedules. Indeed, in recent decades, many
OECD countries have reduced the number of income tax brackets in order to simplify
administration and make their tax systems more transparent. The assumption of linear
taxes can also be rationalized by assuming that the government does not observe indi-
vidual incomes and can thus levy only impersonal, proportional taxes on labor income.8
The proportional income tax rate therefore cannot depend on age.
We abstract from taxes on capital income because the government cannot observe in-
dividual savings.9 Otherwise, the model allows for a rich set of ﬁscal instruments, as the
6For the external eﬀects between insurers in the presence of moral hazard, see Pauly (1974) and
Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986).
7Our assumption that all unemployed workers are subject to liquidity constraints is made solely
for expositional convenience. In any case, the case for UA as an eﬃcient way to oﬀer lifetime income
insurance does not depend on the existence of liquidity constraints.
8The concluding section argues that the potential for a Pareto improvement via individual accounts
does not rest on our assumption that non-linear taxes on static incomes are not available.
9In the face of this lack of information, the government cannot impose a residence-based tax on
voluntary saving. Under the small-open-economy assumption, the government does not want to levy a
source-based tax on capital. Indeed, with inﬁnitely elastic capital supply from abroad, such a source-
based tax would be shifted unto labor. It is thus more eﬃcient to tax labor directly through a labor
income tax rather than indirectly through a source-based capital tax, which distorts not only labor
8government can observe both age and employment status (i.e. unemployed, employed, or
retired). Hence, our model includes categorical social insurance beneﬁts for employment,
early retirement and ordinary old age. These beneﬁts can be set independently of each
other. The government can thus diﬀerentiate lump-sum transfers according to employ-
ment status and age. In practice, this might be achieved through instruments such as
beneﬁts to dependent children and education beneﬁts.
The following sections will present the model and its assumptions in more detail.
2.3. Preferences
As noted, the economy includes three groups of individuals. Those who are fully employed
in period 1 are termed high-income earners and are indicated by the superscript h. Those
who are unemployed during period 1 but do not lose any human capital are called medium-
income earners and are marked by the superscript m, while those who do lose human
capital as a result of the scarring eﬀect of unemployment are referred to as low-income
earners and are denoted by superscript l. Furthermore, we employ the superscript u to
refer to all workers who were unemployed in period 1.
Before the start of period 1, the expected lifetime utility Ue of an agent exerting job
search eﬀort a is
U
e = aV
h +( 1− a)V
u + g (G) − F (a), (2.1)
g
  > 0,g
   ≤ 0, F
  > 0,F
   > 0, 0 <a<1,
where G is a public good that may be provided in either period of life, F (a) represents
disutility of job search eﬀort, while V h and V u are, respectively, the expected lifetime util-
ities attainable by employed and unemployed workers, excluding the disutility of search
eﬀort and the utility from public consumption. Equation (2.1) assumes that a worker’s
probability of ﬁnding a job in period 1 simply equals his search intensity a. The disutility
function F(a) displays increasing marginal disutility of search eﬀort.
supply but also the capital-labor ratio. Note that whereas the government cannot observe voluntary
saving, it can observe the funds in the compulsory saving accounts.
9Once the initial job search has been completed, the resulting disutility is a sunk cost.
The private utility attainable by an employed worker during the remainder of his life



















where 0 < β < 1 represents a discount factor, σ is the intertemporal substitution elas-
ticity,10 Ch
i stands for the high-income earner’s consumption during period i (i =1 ,2)
and eh
i denotes the fraction of period i during which the high-income individual is work-
ing. The homothetic felicity function fi(.,.) models intratemporal substitution between
consumption Ch
i and leisure 1 − eh
i in period i.11
An unemployed worker faces an exogenous probability p of losing human capital as
a result of joblessness in period 1. If he experiences such a scarring eﬀect of joblessness,
he has to accept a lower wage in period 2, in which case he attains private utility V l
during period 2. If he does not lose human capital, he earns the normal wage in period
2 and enjoys private utility V m in that period. p measures the correlation between
unemployment shocks in period 1 and adverse human capital shocks in period 2.
Right after the start of period 1, when the disutility of prior job search has been sunk
but the unemployed agent does not yet know whether his human capital will be scarred
as a result of this unemployment, the expected private utility of an unemployed worker









l +( 1− p)V
m 
, 0 <p<1, (2.3)
where Cu
i stands for an unemployed worker’s consumption during period i. By analogy to
the utility enjoyed by a high-income earner in period 2, the instantaneous private utility











σ ,j = l,m. (2.4)
10The reciprocal of the intertemporal substitution elasticity is the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion.
11If f2(Ch
2,1 − eh

















,w h e r eζi , i = c,e, are constants.
102.4. Budget constraints
During period 1 an employed worker earns the standard wage rate w1, which is subject
to the labor-income tax rate t. He also pays a mandatory social security contribution,
which is levied at the rate s and is credited to his individual account. In addition to the
mandatory saving in his individual account, the employed worker undertakes voluntary





1 (1 − t − s) − S
h + y1, (2.5)
where y1 denotes transfers collected by employed, young individuals.12 As a result of
adverse selection in private capital markets, workers cannot borrow against their expected
future labor and retirement income so that Sh ≥ 0.T h i sc o n s t r a i n ti sn o ta s s u m e dt ob e
binding for high-income earners.
In the second period, the worker faces the same labor-income tax rate t and the same
social security contribution rate s as in the ﬁrst period. He also collects a lump-sum public
transfer y2, which can be interpreted as an ordinary old-age pension granted from the
date the worker reaches the exogenous statutory retirement age. In addition, the worker
receives a beneﬁtg r a n t e da tt h er a t eb2 during that fraction 1 − eh
2 of the second period
in which the worker is actually retired. At the margin, the transfer b2 may be interpreted
as an early retirement beneﬁt,13 since it is paid out from the time the worker chooses
to actually retire.14 Finally, the retired high-income earner may consume the positive
balance Ah on his compulsory individual savings account plus the balance (1 + r)Sh on
his voluntary savings (where r is the real rate of interest). Thus, the high-income earner’s
budget constraint for period 2 becomes
C
h








+ y2 +( 1+r)S
h + A
h, (2.6)
where w2 denotes the wage in period 2. This wage may diﬀer from the wage in period 1
because of diﬀerent wage rates per hour or diﬀerent period lengths.
12These transfers diﬀer from transfers received by unemployed agents (see below). The government
thus can observe employment status.
13b2 can alternatively be interpreted as an unemployment beneﬁt with a lax work test, or as a disability
beneﬁt without strict medical tests.
14Actual retirement is assumed to occur above the age entitling a worker to early retirement beneﬁts.
11The balance on the high-income earner’s individual account equals the contributions
paid into the account during period 1 (with interest added) (1 + r)sw1eh
1, plus the con-
tributions during period 2, sw2eh
2, minus an exogenous fraction (α2) αy of the (early)












− αyy2, 0 ≤ α2,αy ≤ 1. (2.7)
The parameter (α2) αy is a policy instrument reﬂecting the extent to which (early) retire-
ment beneﬁts must be ﬁnanced by withdrawals from the recipient’s individual account.
Under a conventional tax-transfer system without mandatory individual savings accounts,
we have αy = α2 = s =0 .
Consolidating (2.5), (2.6) and (2.7) to eliminate Sh and Ah, we obtain the lifetime
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The social security contribution rate s has dropped out of (2.8). This contribution rate
thus does not distort work eﬀort. Indeed, marginal contributions to the individual account
are in eﬀect returned to the worker in the form of higher retirement beneﬁts. (2.8) reveals
that for the high-income worker the individual account system for retirement beneﬁts in
eﬀect boils down to a cut in the eﬀective rate of (early) retirement beneﬁt( b2 (1 − α2))
(1 − αy)y2.
All unemployed workers collect an unemployment beneﬁt b1 during period 1. b1 is so
low that the credit constraint Sj ≥ 0 ( j = l,m) is binding for all unemployed workers
during period 1, implying15
C
u
1 = b1. (2.9)
Because a medium-income worker earns the standard wage w2 in period 2, he is able
to accumulate a positive balance Am in his individual account. The surplus occurs even
though a fraction α1 of his unemployment beneﬁt is debited to his account in period 1
15In Stiglitz and Yun (2002), workers in the ﬁrst period anticipate liquidity constraints in the second
period and thus engage in precautionary saving in the ﬁrst period. Precautionary saving is absent in our
model because workers are unemployed only in the ﬁrst period and know the second-period wage shocks
when they undertake ﬁrst-period saving decisions.
12and carried forward with interest. The budget constraints for a medium-income worker
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2 − α2b2 (1 − e
m
2 ) − αyy2 − α1b1 (1 + r), 0 ≤ α2,αy,α1 ≤ 1. (2.11)
When the policy parameter α1 is zero, we have a conventional tax-ﬁnanced system of





2 (1 − t)+b2 (1 − α2)(1− e
m
2 )+( 1− αy)y2 − α1b1 (1 + r). (2.12)
Equation (2.12) reveals that, just as for the high-income earner, (early) retirement
accounts imply a cut in the eﬀective rate of (early) retirement beneﬁtf o rt h em e d i u m -
income earner. Unemployment accounts in eﬀect reduce the present value of unemploy-
ment beneﬁts: collecting unemployment beneﬁts in period 1 reduces the account balance
by α1b1 (1 + r) in period 2.
A low-income worker loses human capital as a result of ﬁrst-period unemployment.
Hence, his productivity in period 2 is only a fraction θ of the productivity of other workers,
so he earns only a fraction θ of the standard wage w2. With this worker being hit by
adverse shocks in both periods, social security contributions during period 2 are assumed
not to be suﬃcient to cover the social security beneﬁts that are to be ﬁnanced from






− αyy2 − α1b1 (1 + r) < 0. The lifetime income
insurance built into the individual account system ensures that the low-income earner still
receives the full retirement beneﬁts. The government bail-out in eﬀect means that the
government makes no deduction from the low-income earner’s account for the retirement
beneﬁts but also does not return any of the previously paid social security contributions.











+ y2, 0 < θ < 1. (2.13)
Accordingly, for a low-income worker the social security contribution s works exactly the
same way as the ordinary tax t. Indeed, this contribution s distorts second-period labor
supply, as it is not returned to the low-income earner in the form of higher retirement
beneﬁts.
132.5. Generational accounts
To explore the impact of the reform on the public budget, we denote the generational
account of a worker in group j by gj, j = h,m,l. The generational account measures the
present value of a worker’s net payments to the public sector over his entire life cycle.
Normalizing the total labor force at unity, the present value g of the total net payments
from the private to the public sector can then be written as
g = ag
h +( 1− a)
 
pg
l +( 1− p)g
m 
, (2.14)
w h e r ew er e c a l lt h a ta is the employment rate of the young generation and that a fraction
p o ft h o s ew h oa r eu n e m p l o y e di np e r i o d1e n du pi nt h el o w - i n c o m ec a t e g o r y .
This speciﬁcation of the government budget constraint implies that the government
cannot raise the welfare of new entrants to the labor market by transferring resources
away from older generations who are already on the labor market during the transition.16
Indeed, the government grandfathers the initial arrangements for the older generations
who already lived through the ﬁrst period when the reform is announced and imple-
mented. For these generations, the payments to the government are not put in individual
accounts but remain regular tax ﬁnance. Also the collected social beneﬁts are not debited
to the individuals concerned. Hence, these generations continue to be treated in accor-
dance with the old ﬁscal rules during the rest of their lives. The generational accounts
of these generations are thus not aﬀected by the reform. In this way, we ensure that a
reform that is Pareto-improving for the newly entering generations does not come at the
expense of older generations, so that the reform is truly Pareto improving for all income
groups in all generations.
Treating the system of mandatory individual accounts as a part of the public sector,17
and using (2.7) to eliminate Ah,w eﬁnd for the generational account of a high-income
16This contrasts with studies that employ a steady-state version of the government budget constraint.
17The generational accounts will be the same even if the individual accounts are administered by
private ﬁnancial institutions (assuming that administration costs are the same in the two sectors). For




h =( t + s)w1e
h












1 − y1 +
tw2eh





− (1 − αy)y2
1+r
.
Remembering that a medium-income earner receives unemployment beneﬁts during pe-
riod 1, and using (2.11) to eliminate Am, we write the generational account of a medium-
income earner as
g
m = −b1 +
(t + s)w2em
2 − b2 (1 − em
2 ) − y2 − Am
1+r
(2.16)
= −b1 (1 − α1)+
tw2em
2 − b2 (1 − α2)(1− em
2 ) − (1 − αy)y2
1+r
.
Finally, since the low-income earner is bailed out at the end of his active life, his gener-
ational account is given by
g











After he has completed his initial job search and has received a job oﬀer for the ﬁrst
period, the high-income earner maximizes his remaining lifetime utility (2.2) subject to
the lifetime budget constraint (2.8). The main text assumes that agents fully participate
in the ﬁrst period (with full-time participation being normalized at unity so that eh
1 =1 ) ,
so that ﬁrst-period working hours are exogenously given. The appendix considers the case
with endogenous labor supply in the ﬁrst period and shows that under weak conditions the
major results in the main text continue to hold if ﬁrst-period labor supply is endogenous.
1−eh
2 is interpreted as the fraction of the second period spent in retirement.18 Endogenous
18The benchmark considered in the main text can thus be considered as the case in which labor
supply is elastic on the extensive rather than the intensive margin. Indeed, recent empirical evidence
suggests that labor supply is substantially more elastic on the extensive margin than the intensive margin.
Heckman (1993, p. 118) writes ”A revision is in order for George Stiger’s dictum that all elasticities
are 1 in absolute value. A dictum closer to the truth would be that elasticities are closer to 0 than 1
for hours-of-work equations (or weeks-of-work equations) estimated for those who are working.Am a j o r
lesson of the past 20 years is that the strongest empirical eﬀects of wages and nonlabor income on labor
supply are to be found at the extensive margin — at the margin of entry and exit — where the elasticities
are deﬁnitely not zero.”
15second-period labor supply thus reﬂects an endogenous retirement decision.
With eh
1 =1 , the outcome of this optimization is the following expression for second-
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h ≡ y1 + w1(1 − t)+
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2 represents the (Allen) substitution elasticity between Ch




2). The ﬁrst two terms at the right-hand side of (2.18) stands for the income
eﬀects on labor supply, whereas the last term represents substitution eﬀects. In partic-
ular, a lower price of second-period leisure (i.e.
[w2dt+(1−α2)db2−b2dα2]
[w2(1−t)−b2(1−α2)] > 0) induces both
intratemporal substitution (away from Ch
2 towards (1 − eh
2) and intertemporal substitu-
tion (away from Ch
1 towards Ch
2 and (1 − eh
2)). Both eﬀects reduce labor supply in the
second period. A higher tax rate t thus exerts oﬀsetting income and substitution eﬀects
on labor supply. A reduction in the eﬀective early retirement beneﬁt b2 (1 − α2),i nc o n -
trast, boosts second-period labor supply through both the income and the substitution
eﬀect.
At the start of period 2, the medium-income earner maximizes f2(Cm




2 , subject to (2.12). As demonstrated in the appendix, this yields
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2 )[w2 (1 − t) − b2 (1 − α2)]
Cm
2 +( 1− em




2 is the (Allen) substitution elasticity between Cm
2 and 1−em
2 in felicity f2(Cm
2 ,1−
em
2 ). The ﬁrst two terms at the right-hand side of (2.19) represent income eﬀects. To
illustrate, an increase in α1 reduces the net balance on the medium-earner’s individual
account and the associated negative income eﬀect induces the medium-income earner
to retire later. The third term on the right-hand side of (2.19) captures intratemporal
substitution. As in the case of a high-income earner, a higher tax rate exerts oﬀsetting
substitution and income eﬀects. A higher α2 and a lower b2, in contrast, unambiguously
boost labor supply through both income and substitution eﬀects.
In period 2, a previously unemployed worker who has lost human capital maximizes
f2(Cl
2,1 − el
2) subject to (2.13), resulting in the following labor-supply function (see the
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2 represents the (Allen) substitution elasticity between Cl




2).19 The two terms on the right-hand side of (2.20) represent, respectively,
income eﬀects and intratemporal substitution eﬀects.
The optimal labor supplies em
2 and el
2 determine ex-ante expected utility V u attainable
by an unemployed worker (2.3), and the solution to the high-income worker’s problem
yields his maximum attainable lifetime utility V h (see (2.2)). Having determined V h and







17V u,w eﬁnd optimal search eﬀort by maximizing expected lifetime utility Ue (see (2.1))





Workers thus search up to the point where the expected marginal gain V h−V u in lifetime
utility from an additional unit of search eﬀort exactly oﬀsets the marginal disutility from
search F   (a). With F    (a) > 0,s e a r c he ﬀort (and hence the ﬁrst-period employment
rate) rises with the expected utility diﬀerential between fully employed and unemployed
workers.
2.7. Consumer welfare
T oa n a l y z et h ew e l f a r ee ﬀects of individual accounts, we employ the agents’ indirect




















The appendix provides expressions for the partial derivatives. The signs of the income
eﬀects correspond to the income eﬀects in the ﬁrst term at the right-hand side of (2.18).









































Again, the partial derivatives of these indirect second-period utility functions V l and V m
may be found in the appendix, while their signs correspond to the income eﬀects in (2.19)
and (2.20). The diﬀerent arguments in the various indirect utility functions are explained
by diﬀerences in the budget constraints of the three groups arising from varying labor
market experiences.
20These partial derivatives assume α2,αy < 1 and b2,y 2 > 0.
21These partial derivatives assume α1,b 1 > 0, α2,αy < 1 and b2,y 2 > 0.
183. Pareto-improving social insurance reform through individual
accounts
This section starts out by demonstrating the potential for a Pareto improvement through
the introduction of retirement accounts and early retirement accounts,r e l y i n go nt h e
more eﬃcient lifetime income insurance oﬀered by such accounts. It then illustrates
the Pareto improvement made possible by the lifetime income insurance and liquidity
insurance provided by unemployment accounts.
We employ a procedure inspired by Kaplow (1996). Under this procedure, we design
a policy reform that keeps the (private) utility of all agents constant. We then analyze
whether the reform raises (the present value of) net government revenue. If it does, the
government can make everybody better oﬀ by spending the additional revenues on public
goods, which (given the additive separability of utility functions) do not aﬀect private
sector behavior.
3.1. Retirement accounts
The economy starts out with a ﬁscal system without individual accounts, so that s =
α1 = α2 = αy =0in the initial equilibrium. Suppose now that policy makers want to
rely more on private saving for retirement. They might then decide to cut back on y2 and
at the same time reduce taxes on labor income to induce more life-cycle saving. However,
such a reform is unlikely to be Pareto improving since it implies redistribution away from
low-income households. Indeed, if the initial linear tax system is eﬃcient, such a reform
could not make everybody better oﬀ.
Whereas funding thus cannot accomplish a Pareto-improving reform, the introduction
of individual accounts will. In particular, we will show that, starting from any initial equi-
librium — including one in which the initial linear tax system is eﬃcient — the government
can obtain a Pareto improvement by introducing retirement accounts. We also analyze
the features of the initial equilibrium, including behavioral parameters, that aﬀect the
magnitude of the marginal welfare gains from employing this new instrument.
Consider a ﬁscal reform involving a cut in the tax rate t along with changes in the
instruments y1, s and αy that are calibrated so as to keep the utilities of all agents
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The partial derivatives of the indirect utility functions (provided in the appendix)
imply that






















Since dt < 0,w eh a v eds > 0 and dαy > 0. Hence, starting from the initial equilib-
rium where αy = s =0 , the reform does indeed involve the introduction of retirement
accounts.22
Consider now the eﬀects of the ﬁscal reform on the present value of net government
revenue (2.14). Since the reform keeps private expected utilities of both high-income,
employed workers and unemployed workers constant (dCu
1 = db1 = dV l = dV m =0so
that dV u =0from (2.3)), the ﬁrst-order condition for search (2.21) implies that the
reform aﬀects neither search nor the unemployment rate. The impact on the public
budget therefore depends solely on the eﬀects on the generational accounts of the three
groups of workers. Using (3.1), (3.2), and (3.3) and recalling that α2 =0initially and
that ﬁrst-period labor supply is ﬁxed at eh
1 =1 , we arrive at the following eﬀect of the



























22Given (3.1) and (3.2), the reader may verify that a low-income earner will end up with a negative












.As u ﬃcient (but not necessary) condition for this, and hence for our
assumption Al < 0 to be valid, is that the uncompensated wage elasticity of labor supply is non-negative,




















i = m,h denotes the compensated
eﬀects of the tax rate on second-period labor supply of household i.T h e c o m p e n s a t e d
eﬀects are relevant because the reform keeps the worker’s lifetime utility constant. Since








< 0. The positive impact on net public revenue from the high-income
earner measures the gain in welfare as a result of less distorted labor-supply behavior of
the high-income earner. In particular, the non-distortionary social security contribution
s replaces part of the distortionary tax rate t. Hence, the high-income household can
raise his individual account balance by retiring later. The welfare gains depend on both
the initial distortion of second-period labor supply, tw2 + b2, and the sensitivity of labor
supply with respect to the marginal reward to labor.23 The second factor depends on both
intertemporal and intratemporal substitution (i.e. the elasticities σ and φ
h
2 respectively).
Intertemporal substitution becomes more important if leisure accounts for a large share






2)[w2(1−t)−b2(1−α2)] is large and eh
2 is only
small). Intuitively, more expensive second-period leisure induces high-income earners
to move aggregate consumption out of the second period into the ﬁrst. With higher
ﬁrst-period consumption, saving declines in the anticipation of higher work eﬀort in the
second period. Interestingly enough, by delaying retirement, funding through individual
accounts depresses national saving.24
In a similar way, we ﬁnd for the impact on the generational account of the medium-
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This generational-account impact is quite similar to the corresponding impact for the
high-income earner. Also the medium-income earner faces more incentives to delay his
23Welfare gains are zero if an inﬁnite degree of risk aversion implies σ =0and felicity f2(.,.) does not
allow for substitution between consumption and leisure.
24If labor supply is elastic also in the ﬁrst period, this intertemporal substitution eﬀect does not
necessarily operate in the same direction. In particular, if ﬁrst-period labor supply is more elastic than
second-period labor supply, saving may actually rise as the rewards of higher ﬁrst-period work eﬀort
are in part saved for additional second-period consumption. For a formal analysis of the case with
endogenous ﬁrst-period labor supply, see the appendix.
21retirement because such a delay increases the balance in his RA.25 The additional labor
supply expands the tax base and thereby beneﬁts the generational account. The main
diﬀerence with the high-income earner is that intertemporal substitution eﬀects on la-
bor supply no longer apply; only intratemporal substitution away from second-period
leisure to second-period consumption is relevant. The reason is that the medium-income
household faces liquidity constraints and thus does not adjust its saving behavior.26
For the low-income earners the reform aﬀects neither incentives nor net incomes, so
that gl is unaﬀected. We therefore conclude that retirement accounts can be introduced
so that private utility of all agents remains constant, while at the same time improving
the public budget through an increase in the (present value of the) net tax payments
of medium-income and high-income earners. The additional public resources enable the
government to raise everybody’s utility by oﬀering more public goods. These additional
public resources are especially substantial if second-period labor supply is taxed heavily
at the margin (i.e. t and b2 are large), the intratemporal substitution elasticities between
second-period consumption and second-period leisure are substantial, and the intertem-
poral substitution elasticity σ is large. Intuitively, improved labor-supply incentives are
especially important in the presence of substantial initial distortions and elastic behavior.
25One can check from (2.11) that, starting from a situation without retirement accounts, the introduc-
tion of a marginal retirement account causes the medium-income household to accumulate exactly zero
funds in its account if the household keeps second-period labor supply constant. By reducing second-
period labor supply, the household could run a deﬁcit in its account and draw on the government bail
out. The household does not ﬁnd this optimal, however, because doing so would reduce utility compared
to the initial equilibrium. Indeed, at a negative account balance, households ﬁnd it optimal not to change
their behavior compared to the situation without retirement accounts (since nothing changes compared
to the initial situation, see also the behavior of the low-income household below). By raising labor supply
(compared to the initial equilibrium) in response to the improved incentives (at a non-negative account
balance), the medium-income household accumulates a positive balance and enjoys a second-order gain
in utility. The household ﬁnds it optimal to raise labor supply because in this way it can raise net
retirement beneﬁts. Intuitively, the individual account system implies a kink in the budget constraint at
the initial equilibrium, with lower marginal tax rates for higher labor supplies. This induces households
to move away from the kink by raising labor supply.
26Without liquidity constraints (and with exogenous ﬁrst-period labor supply), the reform would
unambiguously depress saving because medium-run households would increase ﬁrst-period consumption
in anticipation of higher second-period labor income.
22The eﬃciency gain associated with the Pareto improvement arises because the RAs
establish an eﬃciency-enhancing actuarial link between contributions and resources in
retirement for high-income and middle-income workers whose social beneﬁts are currently
paid by distortionary taxes. Improved incentives are obtained without cutting beneﬁts
paid to low-income workers. The reason is that the lifetime income guarantee protects
these latter households, who continue to receive the same positive net transfers from
those with higher lifetime incomes. The RA system eﬀectively enables the government
to implement a selective beneﬁt cut for high-income and middle-income groups without
h a v i n gt oc u tn e tb e n e ﬁts at the bottom of the (lifetime) income ladder. In this way, the
RAs improve the equity-eﬃciency trade-oﬀ.
3.2. Early retirement accounts
With the introduction of early retirement accounts, we use the same instruments as with
the introduction of retirement accounts except that we employ α2 rather than αy to
keep utilities of the medium-income and high-income households constant. Hence, (3.1)























The impacts on the generational accounts are given by the following expressions,





















































































represents the compensated eﬀect of α2 on second-period labor supply
of household i = m,h. Compared to RAs, ERAs exert an additional positive welfare
eﬀect since they in eﬀect reduce the eﬀective rate of early retirement beneﬁt (1 − α2)b2
for medium-income and high-income households. Whereas a cut in the eﬀective old-age
retirement beneﬁt (1 − αy)y2 generates only income eﬀects because households cannot
aﬀect their use of this beneﬁt, the cut in the eﬀective early retirement beneﬁte x e r t sa







> 0,i=1 .2). Indeed, households can determine
their own use of the early retirement beneﬁt by selecting their date of retirement. Since
medium-income and high-income households now pay part of their own early retirement
beneﬁt, they face an incentive to limit the use of this beneﬁt by retiring later. The net
contributions of the medium-income and high-income earners to the public budget thus
increase through two channels: ﬁrst, the lower marginal tax rate t expanding second-
period labor supply (the so-called tax base eﬀect) and, second, the lower eﬀe c t i v er a t eo f
early retirement beneﬁt (1 − α2)b2 reducing the attractiveness of early retirement (the
so-called moral hazard eﬀect). Through these two channels, ERAs produce a double
dividend for the government in the form of both higher labor income tax revenue and
lower expenditure on early retirement beneﬁts.
After the reform, low-income earners continue to receive their early retirement beneﬁts
from the government and thus do not face a direct link between their social security
contribution s and retirement incomes. Hence, just as a RA, an ERA impacts neither
incentives nor net incomes of these households, so that gl is unaﬀected.
The Pareto improvement associated with the introduction of ERAs reﬂects more
eﬃcient lifetime income insurance.27 This more eﬃcient insurance produces not only
a positive tax base eﬀect on account of less distortionary ﬁnance (i.e. through the cut in
the marginal tax rate t), but also less expenditure on insurance beneﬁts as moral hazard
27Just as with retirement beneﬁts, cutting early retirement beneﬁts b2 and tax rates t at the same
time is unlikely to produce a Pareto improvement (as it induces redistribution away from low-income
households).
24is reduced; agents face fewer incentives to draw on the social insurance beneﬁts as they
in fact ﬁnance part of these beneﬁts themselves.
3.3. Unemployment accounts
Unemployment accounts provide both lifetime income insurance and liquidity insurance.
We deal with both these aspects of unemployment accounts in turn.
3.3.1. Lifetime income insurance
The case for unemployment accounts as an eﬃcient instrument for lifetime income insur-
ance can be made by using the same instruments as with the introduction of retirement
accounts, except that we employ α1 rather than αy to keep utilities constant. This implies
















while (3.1) continues to hold. This experiment amounts to a cut in the eﬀective unem-
ployment beneﬁt for medium-income households (1 − α1)b1 and a cut in the ﬁrst-period
work beneﬁt of the high-income household y1.
The eﬀects on the generational accounts of the high-income and medium-income
households are given by, respectively, (3.4) and (3.5), while the low-income households
do not alter their behavior so that dgl =0 . Medium-income households postpone their
retirement because by working longer their social security contributions pay not only for
the unemployment beneﬁts they enjoyed during the ﬁrst period of their life but also for
higher incomes during retirement. Also high-income households expand their second-
period labor supply, as part of the levies they pay on that labor income now result in
higher retirement incomes for themselves.
3.3.2. Liquidity insurance
Unemployment beneﬁts oﬀer liquidity insurance by alleviating the liquidity constraints
facing unemployed agents. We show that UA oﬀer this liquidity insurance more eﬃciently
than regular unemployment beneﬁts do. In particular, we ﬁr s tl o o ka tt h ec a s ei nw h i c h
25higher unemployment beneﬁts oﬀering liquidity insurance are tax ﬁnanced. This reform
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b1 · db1 =0 .
Using the deﬁnition of ex-post utility (2.24) and the partial derivatives of the indirect









u stands for marginal utility of consumption for an unemployed agent in period
1, and λ
l denotes marginal utility of consumption for a low-income worker in period 2.
The impact on the ex-post welfare of the medium-income household amounts to (us-
ing the deﬁnition of ex-post utility (2.23), the partial derivatives of the indirect utility
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m denotes marginal utility of consumption for a medium-income worker in period
2.




t · dt + V
h
y1 · dy1 =0 .
These policy changes generate the following impact on the generational account of
t h el o w - i n c o m ew o r k e r( w i t hs =0 ):
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28The government could alleviate the liquidity constraints completely by raising b1 and y1 and simul-
taneously cutting y2. This could be done in such a way as to keep everybody’s ex post utility unaﬀected.
W ea s s u m e ,h o w e v e r ,t h a tt h eg o v e r n m e n tw a n t st oﬁg h to l d - a g ep o v e r t yb yk e e p i n gy2 at a minimum
level (which could in fact be zero) and cannot commit to reduce old-age pensions below this minimum
level. Indeed, this lack of commitment can be one of the rationales behind the government guaranteeing
a minimum pension level y2, even if agents do not have suﬃcient funds in their individual accounts to
ﬁnance an annuity paying out this minimum pension. The higher is the minimum pension level y2, the
more severe liquidity constraints are likely to be. The reason is that agents may then want to bring
forward their higher second-period incomes to the ﬁrst period. This holds true especially for medium-
































where dt is given by (3.7) and we have used (2.20). The ﬁr s tt e r ma tt h ef a rr i g h t - h a n d
side of (3.9) represents the welfare gain from additional liquidity insurance. In particular,
in a perfect capital market, an unemployed worker would borrow until the marginal utility
gain of higher current consumption (λ
u) would equal the marginal utility loss from lower
future consumption, β (1 + r)λ
l. However, in the present setting with credit constraints
we have λ
u > β (1 + r)λ
l, so that the ﬁrst term at the far right-hand side of (3.9) is
positive. This reﬂects the pure liquidity insurance eﬀect of tax-ﬁnanced unemployment
beneﬁts. Since the reform shifts disposable income from a period with lower towards a
period with higher marginal utility of consumption, it enables the government to extract
more net revenue from unemployed workers over their lifetimes without harming their
welfare.
The second term at the far right-hand side of (3.9) shows that the low-earner’s gen-
erational account improves also due to a negative income eﬀect in the second period. By
shifting resources from the second to the ﬁr s tp e r i o do fl i f e ,a g e n t ’ se n t e rt h es e c o n dp e -
riod with fewer resources. This stimulates agents to retire later. Indeed, the implicit loan
the government provides to liquidity-constrained households in eﬀect allows households
to dissave more. These dissavings boost labor supply at the end of the working life.
In contrast to the other terms at the second terms at the right-hand side of (3.9), the
ﬁnal term is negative. It captures the negative substitution eﬀect on labor supply that
is associated with a higher tax rate t ﬁnancing the unemployment beneﬁts.
The generational account of the medium-income earner is aﬀected in the following
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The ﬁrst two terms at the right-hand side of (3.10) are positive and correspond to
the liquidity insurance eﬀect (capital-market imperfections imply λ
u > β (1 + r)λ
m) and
27the second-period income eﬀect in second-period labor supply, respectively. The negative
substitution eﬀect on second-period labor supply associated with distortionary tax ﬁnance
is represented by the third term at the right-hand side of (3.10).
The policy changes impact the generational account for the high-income earners only
through changes in the marginal tax rate t, and the overall impact on this generational
account is given by expression (3.4) with dt given by (3.7). The compensated increase in
the labor tax rate t thus reduces a high-income worker’s net contribution to the public
budget by motivating him to retire earlier.
We compare these eﬀects on the generational accounts of tax-ﬁnanced unemployment
beneﬁts with the corresponding impacts if the government provides liquidity insurance
through an UA. In that case, ex post utility of the low-income earner is maintained by













This generates exactly the same impact on the low-earner’s generational account as in
(3.9). The positive ﬁrst term versus the negative third term implies a trade-oﬀ between
providing liquidity insurance and containing labor-supply distortions. Raising unem-
ployment beneﬁts through UAs does distort labor supply of the low-income households
because the additional social security contributions are not returned to these agents in
terms of higher retirement beneﬁts. Hence, the ﬁnancing of the additional unemployment
beneﬁts remains distortionary, even if provided through UA. Relieving capital-market
d i s t o r t i o n st h u sd o e sn o tc o m ef r e e .
With the UA ﬁnancing the additional unemployment beneﬁts, the parameter α1 is
changed so that ex-post utility of the medium-income household is aﬀected in exactly the
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29O n ec a nv e r i f yt h a tt h em e d i u m - i n c o m eh o u s e h o l daccumulates exactly zero funds in its account.
The household can slightly improve its welfare by reducing its labor supply so that the household is bailed
out by the government. To prevent this from happening, the government has to marginally reduce the
asset level below which the government tops up the individual accounts of agents at retirement. This
reduces the scope for bailing out the low-income household. When UA are introduced, however, this










The impact on the medium earner’s generational account is the same as (3.10), except
that the negative third term (with dt) drops out. The ﬁnancing of unemployment beneﬁts
is no longer distortionary, as the social security contributions paid by the medium-income
earner raise individual retirement incomes.
Since the employed policy instruments b1,α1, and s do not aﬀect the welfare of the
high-income earner, the government does not need to change any other policy instruments.
Also, since the high earner is thus not aﬀected at all, his generational account is not
changed. Hence, just as the generational account of the medium-income earner, the
generational account of the high-income earner improves compared to the case in which
additional unemployment beneﬁts are tax ﬁnanced. Additional unemployment beneﬁts
provided through UA therefore alleviate capital-market distortions at lower eﬃciency
costs in terms of harmed labor-market incentives than regular tax-ﬁnanced unemployment
beneﬁts do.30
Raising unemployment beneﬁts paid out of UA thus increases the scope for intertem-
poral reallocation of disposable income towards the beginning of the working life. Es-
sentially, unemployment accounts allow unemployed, medium-income workers to borrow
against their own future labor income; part of the unemployment beneﬁts collected in the
ﬁrst period is debited to the worker’s individual account, thus reducing his consumption
possibilities in the second period. In this way, UAs enable the government to increase
an unemployed, medium-income worker’s consumption possibilities during the period in
which marginal utility of consumption is the highest, without increasing the present value
of tax-ﬁnanced unemployment beneﬁts (discounted at the government’s borrowing rate
of interest) and without undermining incentives for these agents.
30To establish this, one should note that both ways of raising unemployment beneﬁts change
V l,Vm,Vh, and V u in the same way and thus alter search eﬀort a in the same fashion. Hence, as
unemployment changes, both reforms modiﬁes the composition of taxpayers in the same way. Through
this channel, they thus generate the same impact on the government budget (2.14).
293.4. Correlation between adverse shocks
The parameter p, indicating the proportion of unemployed workers who lose human cap-
ital as a result of joblessness, measures the correlation between adverse shocks. The
stronger this correlation, the smaller are the aggregate eﬃciency gains from the compul-
sory savings accounts. This is because a larger value of p implies that more households are
unable to accumulate a positive balance on these accounts. The government thus needs
to bail out more agents, who thus do not face improved labor-supply incentives and there-
fore do not enhance their generational accounts. Indeed, compulsory savings accounts
providing more eﬃcient lifetime income insurance beneﬁt the generational accounts of
high-income and medium-income earners only. Similarly, as far as liquidity insurance is
concerned, compared to tax-ﬁnanced beneﬁts, funded unemployment beneﬁts produce a
stronger impact on the generational accounts of only these latter households. Hence, the
larger the proportion of low-income households (which is determined by p and a), the
less substantial the eﬃciency gains are.
Loosely speaking, higher values for p and lower values for a imply a smaller middle
class and thus — in the context of a European welfare state — a smaller number of taxpayers
whose taxes can serve to ﬁnance part of their own beneﬁts. Within a more polarized
society, the ﬁscal system to a larger degree redistributes resources from high lifetime-
income earners to low lifetime-income earners, rather than reallocating resources over
the life cycle of the same individuals. Indeed, more correlation between adverse shocks
(a higher value of p) reduces the scope for improving incentives through self insurance in
the basis of individual savings.
Another related factor in determining the scope for self insurance is the relative length
of the two periods. A longer period of unemployment raises the likelihood that unem-
ployment produces a scarring eﬀect on human capital (thus raising p). In addition, it
increases the number of individuals that need be bailed out through the public pension
guarantee; the longer the period of unemployment, the larger the fraction of individuals
who have not accumulated enough funds in their accounts at their statutory retirement
age to be able to ﬁnance their own public pension. Moreover, with longer unemployment
spells, liquidity constraints are also likely to become less serious as unemployed young
individuals scale down their consumption in anticipation of low lifetime incomes. Hence,
30long unemployment durations in slow-moving labor markets make individual accounts
less attractive as an instrument to provide lifetime income insurance and liquidity insur-
ance. Indeed, long unemployment spells in eﬀect imply that adverse shocks are strongly
correlated over time so that self insurance is less eﬃcient.
To protect agents hit by correlated shocks against poverty, while at the same time
enhancing their labor-supply incentives, the government must rely on other instruments
than self insurance.31 In particular, the government may collect additional information
by closely monitoring job search and imposing penalties on less active search. In this
connection, workfare may play a useful role because the mere threat of being put on
workfare is likely to boost job search.
4. Conclusions
This paper explored whether ﬁnancing part of social insurance through mandatory con-
tributions to individual savings accounts can produce a Pareto-improving welfare gain.
Through these accounts, the middle class would engage in self insurance by saving for
their own social insurance beneﬁts. The system would continue to provide lifetime income
insurance by oﬀering a public pension guarantee to low-income workers with a deﬁcit on
their savings accounts at the time of statutory retirement. Moreover, the account system
would allow unemployed workers to borrow against their future labor income by drawing
unemployment beneﬁts from their accounts, thereby alleviating credit constraints.
To investigate the incentive and welfare eﬀects of such a ﬁscal reform, we set up a
two-period model in which agents face an endogenous risk of involuntary unemployment
and an exogenous risk (conditional on being unemployed) of losing future human capital
as a result of the scarring eﬀect of unemployment. The model includes endogenous job
search, retirement decisions and life cycle saving by fully employed workers as well as
credit constraints for unemployed workers. Within this framework, we demonstrate that
the introduction of compulsory savings accounts would produce eﬃciency gains in credit
markets (in the case of unemployment accounts) and labor markets. Paradoxically, these
31The model assumes that labor is homogeneous. If low-skilled labor is complementary to high-skilled
labor in production, the improved labor supply incentives of high-skilled workers may raise the low-skilled
wage. Through these indirect general equilibrium eﬀects, also low-skilled labor supply may be boosted.
31gains produced by individual savings accounts would not only postpone retirement but
also raise ﬁrst-period consumption, thereby depressing national saving. The eﬃciency
gains associated with lower saving and higher labor supply allow the government to gen-
erate an ex-post Pareto improvement so that all agents beneﬁt. These gains arise because
the savings accounts establish an eﬃciency-enhancing actuarial link between taxes and
beneﬁts for high-income and middle-income workers — who currently pay distortionary
taxes partly to ﬁnance distortionary social beneﬁts to themselves — without reducing net
transfers paid to the low-income workers who remain protected by the lifetime income
guarantee. The savings accounts thus eﬀectively enable the government to implement a
selective beneﬁt cut for high-income and middle-income groups without having to reduce
beneﬁts at the bottom of the income ladder. Savings accounts enrich the ﬁscal armory of
the government by adding a non-linear element to an otherwise linear ﬁscal system. In
this way, compulsory savings accounts improve the equity-eﬃciency trade-oﬀ, enabling
the government to engineer a Pareto welfare improvement, even if it has optimized the
pre-existing tax-transfer system.
The present paper is only a ﬁrst step towards a full analysis of the economic costs and
beneﬁts of basing transfers on lifetime incomes. We see a number of related issues for
future research.32 First, in future work, we plan to allow for more heterogeneity among
agents — for example, by distinguishing a continuum of workers with diﬀerent skills and
by allowing for more periods with involuntary unemployment.
A second issue, closely related to the ﬁrst, is to allow for non-linear income taxes.
Such a rich tax schedule allows us to oﬀset the redistributional eﬀects of the compul-
sory saving scheme in order to generate a Pareto-improving reform for a continuum of
agents.33 Moreover, we can then investigate what the beneﬁt sw o u l db eo fb a s i n gap e r -
32Another political-economy issue is how more individual funding accompanied by targeted redistrib-
ution aﬀects the political economy of the welfare state and its associated political risks. In particular,
individual funding may produce a stronger ownership of social insurance. This may make it more dif-
ﬁcult for the government to change beneﬁt rules, thereby reducing political risks but also reducing the
ﬂexibility to adjust the beneﬁt rules in response to unanticipated shocks. Whereas individual funding
may increase the political support of the middle class for social insurance, targeted redistribution to the
underclass may undermine the support for this redistribution.
33Kaplow (1996) employs a non-linear income tax to neutralize the income eﬀects of a higher public
good supply on a continuum of agents.
32son’s net ﬁscal contribution on his individual lifetime income, as reﬂected in the balance
on his individual account at the time of retirement, as opposed to his individual annual
income. In this connection, one may also want to explore the optimal mix between self
insurance, compulsory insurance of veriﬁable events (e.g. disability), and active labor-
market policies, including workfare, in enhancing labor-market incentives facing various
skill levels.
Finally, whereas the present paper has considered only marginal reforms, which in-
volve only one particular formulation of lifetime income insurance and which start from
an initial situation without any compulsory savings accounts, we intend to characterize
an optimal savings account system producing eﬃcient lifetime income and liquidity in-
surance. In this context, we should explore how far the government can go in setting
a non-linear tax schedule based on lifetime income and in oﬀering liquidity insurance
without violating self-selection constraints that must be respected in order to protect
incentives for job search and work.
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35Technical Appendix
1. Indirect utility functions
1.1 High-income earners
From (2.2) and (2.8), we construct the Lagrangian for a worker who has obtained a






























1 (1 − t) − y1 −
[w2eh










Using the envelope theorem, and noting that the Lagrange multiplier λ
h measures the
marginal utility of (exogenous) lifetime income, we ﬁnd the properties of the high-income







































































































2 (1 − t) − b2 (1 − α2)(1− e
m
2 ) − (1 − αy)y2 + α1b1 (1 + r)]. (4.2)
36This yields the following derivatives of the medium-income worker’s indirect utility func-














































































In a similar way, we construct the period 2 Lagrangian for a low-income worker from













































































From the Lagrangian (4.1), a high-income earner’s ﬁrst-order conditions for optimal




















































































1 +( 1− e
h
1)w1 (1 − t)+
Ch
2 +( 1− eh
2)[w2 (1 − t) − b2 (1 − α2)]
1+r
(4.8)
= y1 + w1(1 − t)+




We ﬁnd intertemporal behavior by multiplying (4.4) and (4.5) by, respectively, Ch
1
and (1 − eh



















1 +( 1− e
h
1)w1(1 − t)], (4.10)
w h e r ew eh a v eu s e dt h eh o m o t h e t i c i t yo ff1(Ch
1,1 − eh
1). We can manipulate (4.6) and



















2 +( 1− e
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2)[w2 (1 − t) − b2 (1 − α2)]}.
(4.11)





















2 +( 1− eh
2)[w2 (1 − t) − b2 (1 − α2)]
.
Log-linearizing this expression, we arrive at
˜ u
h




1˜ t − σγ
h
2(w2dt +( 1− α2)db2 − b2dα2)/[w2 (1 − t) − b2 (1 − α2)], (4.12)
where uh
i ≡ fi(Ch
i ,1 − eh













At i l d es t a n d sf o rar e l a t i v ec h a n g e( e x c e p tf o rt h et a xr a t e ,w h e r e˜ t ≡ dt/(1 − t)).
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Intratemporal behavior in period 2 is found by dividing (4.6) by (4.7) and log-
linearizing the result to arrive at
˜ C
h




2[w2dt +( 1− α2)db2 − b2dα2]/[w2 (1 − t) − b2 (1 − α2)], (4.16)
where v
j
i ≡ 1 − e
j
i ; j = h,m,l; i =1 ,2. φ
h
i denotes the substitution elasticity Ch
i and vh
i
(i =1 ,2) in felicity fi(.,.). By using (4.4) and (4.5), we ﬁnd in a similar way
˜ C
h




















w h e r ew eh a v eu s e dt h ed e ﬁnitions of γh
i and the ﬁrst-order conditions (4.4), (4.5), (4.6),
and (4.7).
Solving ˜ vh
1 and ˜ vh


















2[w2dt +( 1− α2)db2 − b2dα2]/[w2 (1 − t) − b2 (1 − α2)]. (4.20)
Combining intratemporal and intertemporal substitution
Substituting (4.14) and (4.15) into (4.19) and (4.20) to eliminate ˜ uh
i , we ﬁnd for the









˜ zh +( 1− δ)
 
σγh
1˜ t − σγh
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1˜ t − σγh











The case with exogenous labor supply in the ﬁrst period is given by eh
1 =1 , so that
γ1 = ηh
















[w2dt +( 1− α2)db2 − b2dα2]
[w2 (1 − t) − b2 (1 − α2)]
 
.
With endogenous ﬁrst-period labor supply, the introduction of retirement accounts




















A lower tax rate (i.e. dt < 0) improves this generational account under weak con-














are negative.34 These inequalities are met (see (4.21) and (4.22)) if
intertemporal substitution is small compared to intratemporal substitution (i.e. σ is
small compared to φ
h





2;b2 = α2 =0 ) . With b2 > 0 and γh
2 > γh
1 (the latter inequality may be met be-
cause the second period includes retirement and is thus likely to feature relatively large
leisure demand), a higher tax rate is likely to boost the generational accounts even if in-














> 0). The reason
is that intertemporal substitution of leisure towards the ﬁrst period beneﬁts the public
ﬁnances, as leisure is subsidized most in the second period on account of early retirement
beneﬁts (i.e. b2 > 0). This holds also if (as in the case of the introduction of ERAs)
the shadow cost of leisure in the second period is increased not only through a lower t
but also a higher α2. Such a reform shifts labor supply from the ﬁrst period to the more
heavily taxed second period, thereby beneﬁting the public ﬁnances.35














cannot both be positive at the same
time
35Moreover, if leisure demand is relatively large in the second period (i.e. eh
2 <e h
1), labor supply
is relatively elastic in the second period so that a cut in the marginal tax rate in the second period
is especially eﬀective in boosting the tax base. Indeed, in these circumstances, Ramsey considerations
would dictate a lower optimal eﬀe c t i v et a xr a t ei np e r i o d2t h a ni np e r i o d1 .
402.2 Medium-income earners
Maximizing the Lagrangian (4.2), we obtain the ﬁrst-order conditions for the optimal
































m [w2 (1 − t) − b2 (1 − α2)], (4.24)
C
m
2 +[ w2(1 − t) − b2 (1 − α2)](1 − e
m
2 )=w2(1 − t)+( 1− αy)y2 − α1b1 (1 + r). (4.25)
Dividing (4.23) by (4.24) and log-linearizing the result, we arrive at
˜ C
m




2 [w2dt +( 1− α2)db2 − b2dα2]/[w2 (1 − t) − b2 (1 − α2)], (4.26)
where φ
m
2 denotes the substitution elasticity between Cm
2 and vm
























w2(1−t)+(1−αy)y2−α1b1(1+r). Solving ˜ vm
2 from (4.26)







2 +( 1− γ
m)φ
m
2 [w2dt +( 1− α2)db2 − b2dα2]/[w2 (1 − t) − b2 (1 − α2)]}.
















b2 db2 + V
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By a similar procedure as for the medium-income earners (see sub-section 2.2 of the




































l [θw2 (1 − t − s) − b2], (4.29)
C
l
2 +[ θw2 (1 − t − s) − b2](1 − e
l
2)=θw2 (1 − t − s)+y2 (4.30)
We use (4.28) and (4.29) in a similar procedure as with the medium-income household
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t dt + V
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sds + V
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b2db2 + V
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y2dy2
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where ψ
l ≡ 1
λl[Cl
2+[θw(1−t−s)−b2](1−el
2)].
42